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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 GENEVA 001403

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SUBJECT: JCIC-XXVII: (U) SECOND WORKING GROUP MEETING ON  
RSM-56 ATTRIBUTION AND SS-25 ELIMINATIONS, JUNE 2, 2005

REF: A. RUSSIAN BRIEF ON RSM-56 FROM MARCH 2005 NRRC TALKS  
[1](#)B. GENEVA 1342 (JCIC-XXVII-010)

Classified By: Dr. George W. Look, U.S. Representative  
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).  
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

- [1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXVII-016.
- [1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: June 2, 2005  
Time: 10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.  
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

#### SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A second Working Group meeting with all Parties present was held at the Russian Mission on June 2, 2005, to discuss RSM-56 warhead attribution and throw-weight accountability, and SS-25 elimination inspections. The U.S. Delegation informed the Russian Delegation that it had reviewed Russia's briefing, presented during the NRRC Consultations held in March 2005, on plans for the RSM-56 and still had questions regarding Russia's plans for launcher conversion, flight-testing, warhead attribution, and throw-weight accountability. The U.S. Delegation requested that Russia forward information to the United States on its plans as soon as it became available to help facilitate agreement in the JCIC on the procedures to be used to establish throw-weight accountability. The Russian Delegation stated that the deployed SLBM launchers on a Typhoon submarine are in the process of being converted, in accordance with Treaty provisions, and would become accountable as RSM-56 launchers as soon as the converted submarine left the conversion facility in Severodvinsk. However, determination of RSM-56 warhead attribution and throw-weight accountability was not feasible until after some flight-testing. This situation represented the first time a Party declared a new strategic offensive arm under the Treaty. The Russian Delegation confirmed that Russia planned to forego the prototype phase and would flight-test the RSM-56 SLBM from the newly-converted RSM-56 launchers on a Typhoon submarine.

[1](#)4. (S) On the issue of SS-25 ICBM elimination, the Russian Delegation stated that it would not present the section of the missile that the United States describes as the forward section of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) and which Russia describes as the guidance and control section for elimination. Russia also stated that it would object to U.S. inspectors' use of open-source photographs during the elimination inspection to confirm the identity of nozzles presented for elimination. The United States responded that its inspectors would continue to use these photographs because they assisted inspectors in determining the types of nozzles that were being eliminated. Russia also stated that it would not object if U.S. inspectors continued to make comments in the inspection report that they could not confirm nozzle types if they stopped making comments in the inspection report that they could not confirm the elimination of the entire missile.

[1](#)5. (S) The Russian Delegation made a proposal to assist U.S. inspectors in confirming the type of ICBM undergoing elimination if the length of the first-stage rocket motor case was shortened during propellant removal by low pressure burning. Russia offered to make a statement that would list the length of the cylindrical portion of the first stage, exclusive of the fore and aft end domes. This measurement, 6.54 meters, could be obtained after the propellant had been removed, since it may not be possible to obtain the end-dome to end-dome measurement.

RUSSIA'S PLANS FOR RSM-56 WARHEAD  
AND THROW-WEIGHT ATTRIBUTION

16. (S) Buttrick asked Russia to confirm that it would not present its brief from the March 2005 NRRC Consultations (REF A) here at the JCIC. Fedorchenko responded that Russia had no instructions to provide this briefing, nor did it have the necessary software and equipment available. Buttrick stated that the U.S. Delegation was able to obtain a copy of this briefing from Washington and had a couple of questions. The first question for Russia was whether RSM-56 flight-testing would be conducted from the deployed SLBM launchers on the submarine currently undergoing conversion to support the RSM-56 SLBM. The second question was whether Russia was bypassing the prototype validation phase with the RSM-56.

17. (S) Fedorchenko responded to the first question by confirming that flight-tests will be conducted from the Typhoon submarine currently undergoing launcher conversion to RSM-56, and that the notification for the SLBM launcher conversion had been submitted in January 2005, by NRRC notification STR-05-21/011. He said that the third paragraph of this notification states that 20 launchers were being converted from RSM-52 to RSM-56. Fedorchenko further stated that, in April 2005, Russia had provided advance notification that the Typhoon submarine would be entering the Severodvinsk SLBM Launcher Conversion Facility (Ref: RNC/STR 05-91/53) and that on May 5, 2005, launcher conversion had commenced (Ref: RNC/STR 05-126/56). Fedorchenko stated that conversion will be completed at Severodvinsk before testing begins.

18. (S) Buttrick asked when RSM-56 warhead attribution would be declared. Fedorchenko said that RSM-56 warhead attribution was planned to be accomplished after flight-tests were complete, in accordance with Article III. Buttrick asked when the conversion of the 20 Typhoon launchers to support the RSM-56 would be completed. He explained that Treaty Article III, Paragraph 7(c), defines when the launchers on an existing submarine undergoing conversion are considered to be converted. Fedorchenko confirmed this requirement. Buttrick asked whether Russia was going to declare RSM-56 warhead attribution before the first flight-test, and what missile type the launchers would be attributed with when the flight-test commenced. Fedorchenko replied that as soon as the converted submarine leaves the conversion facility and begins sea trials, it will be attributed with 20 RSM-56 launchers.

19. (S) Fedorchenko explained that the aggregate number of warheads for this submarine would be annotated with an asterisk in the MOU. Russia would not indicate either RSM-56 throw-weight accountability or warhead attribution until after flight-testing had taken place. He said that the Nerpich'ye submarine base will be attributed with 20 RSM-56 launchers and 20 fewer SS-N-20 launchers. The first RSM-56 that is produced will be reported as a deployed missile. He also indicated that the aggregate warhead number in the MOU would be decreased by 200 when the 20 existing SS-N-20 launchers completed conversion to RSM-56, since each SS-N-20 SLBM is attributed with ten warheads. Buttrick asked how many warheads the United States should consider for each of the launchers of the converted SSBN equipped with the RSM-56 SLBMs when the submarine first comes out of the conversion facility. Fedorchenko responded that the United States could pick any number; it would be not less than one and not more than ten.

110. (S) Buttrick explained that he understood the difficulty in determining throw-weight and warhead attribution prior to flight-tests and that he understood that Russia was not ready to declare warhead attribution for this new missile. He reminded Fedorchenko that, at the last meeting, the Russian Delegation said that the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement would apply to throw-weight accountability for RSM-56. He requested that Russia inform the United States as soon as possible if fewer than eight flight-tests for the RSM-56 would be conducted so that the Parties could begin the process for establishing the throw-weight accountability for the RSM-56. This discussion had to take place in the JCIC pursuant to the Thirty-Second Agreed Statement. Any delay in this process could create Treaty problems associated with the deployment of the RSM-56 SLBM.

111. (S) Fedorchenko thanked Buttrick for understanding Russia's situation and noted that he concurred with Kottmyer's statement in the previous meeting (REF B) regarding Treaty drafters not foreseeing this situation. First, we had to make provisions for SLBMs in launch canisters. The next problem is that not having a prototype phase impacts warhead and throw-weight accountability. He said Russia would provide the United States with flight-test telemetry recordings and interpretative materials 65 days after flight-tests. This data would also include the usual warhead dispensing and separation information, and the maximum number of warheads would be accounted for. He said throw-weight accountability would have to be discussed in the JCIC after flight-testing had begun because it did not make sense to discuss it prior to flight-testing.

112. (S) Shevtsov said that this was another case of a situation that was not envisioned when the Treaty was created. He used Vandenberg as an example, but Fedorchenko promptly refuted this, stating there was no connection and this was not a good analogy. Fedorchenko stated that the RSM-56 represented the first strategic offensive arm of a new type created under the Treaty and that the Treaty Parties had no experience or template to follow. He stated further that Russia was trying to be legally pure, had informed the Parties in advance of the development of the RSM-56, and had put the RSM-56 issue on the JCIC agenda. He said that Russia performed a demonstration of the missile in September 2004, and was waiting for the JCIC agreement on corresponding documents before Russia begins testing.

#### SS-25 ELIMINATION

113. (S) Buttrick began by reiterating U.S. concerns raised at the first meeting. He said the Parties had discussed three areas of concern. First, in terms of the missing forward portion of the SCDM that was not presented as part of the SS-25 elimination, Russia had stated that it did not consider this portion of the missile either part of the SCDM or part of the front section of the SS-25. Buttrick asked Fedorchenko what Russia considered this portion of the missile to be. Fedorchenko responded that it was an independent part of the missile that contained the guidance and control devices. Just because it was connected to the SCDM does not mean that it was part of it; he referred to the Treaty Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol, Section I, Subparagraph 2(b). Buttrick responded by reading the Treaty definition of SCDM as "a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids." Buttrick, using open-source photographs of the SS-25 missile as a visual aid, said that, in accordance with this definition, the whole section of the missile forward of the SCDM containing the maneuvering rockets separates from the final stage of the missile and provides guidance and control to target. Section I, Subparagraph 4(c) of the C or E Protocol requires the destruction of the SCDM and front section of the missile; it was clearly the intent of the Treaty drafters to eliminate the whole section of the SS-25 ICBM forward of the SCDM. Buttrick said Fedorchenko had told the U.S. Delegation in the previous meeting that Paragraph 2 of the C or E Protocol allows Russia to remove the guidance and control systems from the missile. Buttrick stated that this provision does not state that the entire section of the missile may be removed prior to elimination. Buttrick said that Dr. Look wanted an explanation from Russia as to why it believes the section of the missile containing the guidance system does not need to be eliminated. Fedorchenko indicated that Russia had the right to remove guidance and control systems. Buttrick asked Fedorchenko if the devices inside could not be removed without damage and Fedorchenko acknowledged that this was so. Buttrick asked why Russia was concerned about damaging these components since the SS-25 was being eliminated.

114. (S) Buttrick stated he understood that Russia would not be providing the section of the missile containing the guidance and control system for destruction and said that he would take this information back to Washington.

#### IDENTIFICATION OF SS-25 NOZZLES

115. (S) Regarding the SS-25 nozzle identification issue, Buttrick reminded Fedorchenko of the SS-24 eliminations and asked him whether he agreed that there were no concerns with these eliminations. Fedorchenko responded that the topic of SS-24 eliminations was not on the agenda, but there were concerns with U.S. inspectors using photographs provided by Ukraine during the first SS-24 inspection in Russia. Russia had chosen not to raise them at the time and now considered the issue closed because U.S. inspectors have not used the photographs on subsequent inspections.

116. (S) Buttrick asked Fedorchenko whether Russia would object if U.S. inspectors brought photographs from an open-source book copyrighted in Russia to identify SS-25 nozzles and, if so, on what grounds. Fedorchenko responded that inspectors were required to use official photographs during inspections. Buttrick said that U.S. inspectors planned on continuing to use photographs to help them identify SS-25 nozzles during elimination inspections, and that it would be helpful if Russia could confirm they are accurate. Fedorchenko replied that unofficial photographs can be used for preparation, but not for inspections. Buttrick said that U.S. inspectors could not identify the nozzles, Russia had not provided any reference photographs, and the nozzles presented during the inspection were separated from the missiles. It was, therefore, impossible to confirm that the nozzles corresponding to the SS-25 missile being eliminated had in fact been eliminated.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL REGARDING  
NOZZLE/MISSILE ELIMINATION

17. (S) Fedorchenko stated that he had a significant proposal regarding the SS-25 nozzle. He suggested that Russia would not object to U.S. inspectors continuing to make a comment in the inspection report, that the inspectors could not confirm the type of nozzles for the first, second, and third stages of the SS-25 ICBM, if they would no longer make comments that they could not confirm the elimination of the missile. He noted that the Treaty did not require that photographs of the nozzles be provided, and said he understood the inspector's difficulty. He said trust was required and he hoped the United States believed that Russia was providing SS-25 nozzles for elimination. Furthermore, Fedorchenko stated that he failed to comprehend how the United States could not consider these missiles to be eliminated. He said that none of the four missiles exist any longer and that this was a fact. Buttrick stated that he did not think this would satisfy the requirements of the C or E Protocol, but said he would forward this information to Washington for consideration.

18. (S) Buttrick asked whether Russia planned to continue to present pre-cut SS-25 nozzles that had large segments of the nozzles removed, as had been done during the first elimination inspection. He reminded Russia that the understanding between Russia and the United States was that pre-cuts could be made as long as the cuts did not affect the shape, dimensions, or distinguishing features of the element that was being eliminated. Fedorchenko replied that, as Russia readied more SS-25 ICBMs for elimination, there would be fewer occurrences of this situation. However, there were several nozzles that had been subjected to pre-cuts and may have segments missing, but he was not sure how many.

RUSSIAN PROPOSAL FOR  
FIRST-STAGE MEASUREMENT

19. (S) Buttrick said that dimensional changes of SS-25 first-stage rocket motors after propellant was removed by low-pressure burning could cause difficulty for inspectors in confirming missile type for the elimination following burn-out of the motor. He expressed interest in Fedorchenko's proposal on this issue. Fedorchenko tabled a draft statement and before and after burn photographs to help explain the proposal. He indicated that the proposal consisted of measuring the length of the cylindrical portion of the first-stage rocket motor. It should be possible to obtain a consistent measurement of 5.64 meters because Russian experts expected only the end domes to be eroded as the result of low-pressure burning. To illustrate the problem, he provided photographs showing an SS-25 first-stage motor before it had been burned out and a photograph after burn-out had occurred. He added that U.S. inspectors also could use these photographs to assist them in confirming the type of ICBM undergoing elimination. Buttrick stated that he would take this information back to Washington. Buttrick concluded by asking how soon inspectors will encounter these motors; and Fedorchenko responded "soon."

20. (S) Begin text (Russian-proposed statement on the elimination of SS-25 ICBMs of July 31, 1991):

Official Translation

JCIC-XXVII  
June 2, 2005

Statement by the Representative of the  
Russian Federation to the  
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the  
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and  
the United States of America on the Reduction and  
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms  
of July 31, 1991

On the Elimination of SS-25 ICBMs

In connection with the beginning of SS-25 ICBM elimination, the Russian side reaffirms that such elimination will be carried out in strict accord with the Treaty provisions governing conversion or elimination of the items covered by the Treaty.

These provisions provide for the right of the inspected Party to remove the fuel from the missile stages before a confirmatory inspection.

The Russian Federation removes the fuel from the stages of SS-25 ICBMs by slow-burning them without the nozzle. The slow burn can result in burning out the end domes of these stages. This makes it impossible to use the length of the first stage, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, to confirm the type of ICBM. In view of this, the Russian side

proposes that in such cases the length of the cylindrical portion of the first stage casing, which is equal to 6.54 meters and which does not change as a result of the slow burn, be used to confirm the type of an SS-25 ICBM located at a conversion or elimination facility. The relevant photographs are attached.

End text.

¶21. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Russian-proposed Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation to the JCIC on the Elimination of SS-25 ICBMs, dated June 2, 2005;

-- Picture of SS-25 First-Stage Motor Before Burn-out; and

-- Picture of SS-25 First-Stage Motor After Burn-out (Pictures e-mailed to State/AC/SNI).

¶22. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Buttrick  
Mr. Dunn  
Col(sel) Emig  
Mr. Foley  
Mr. Herrick  
Ms. Kottmyer  
Mr. Mullins  
Mr. Sessions  
Mr. Singer  
Mr. Smith  
Mr. French (Int)

Belarus

Mr. Grinevich

Kazakhstan

Mr. Baysuanov

Russia

Col Fedorchenko  
Mr. Venevtsev  
Col Razumov  
Mr. Bolotov  
Col Maksimenko  
Lt Col Novikov  
Col Ryzhkov  
Ms. Sorokina  
Mr. Smirnov  
Mr. Shabalin  
Col Yegorov  
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int)

Ukraine

Dr. Shevtsov  
Col Taran

¶23. (U) Look sends.  
Moley